R-12308

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES AREA FORCES, PACIFIC

STAFF STUDY

"BAKER-SIXTY"

OPERATION

JUN 2 1 1965



Edition 1 12 August 1945

Report Documentation Page					Form Approved 1B No. 0704-0188	
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Form Approved



STAFF STUDY

OPERATION

"BAKER-SIXTY"

12 August 1945

- 1. The attached Staff Study is derived from the Basic Outline Plan for "BLACKLIST" Operations, Edition Three, 8 August 1945. It constitutes the basis for directives to be issued for an initial contingent airborne operation to occupy critical portions of the TOKYO area, in case conditions exist on target date favorable for such airborne entrance.
- 2. Pending the issue of directives based thereon, the Staff Study is circulated to senior Commanders and Staff Sections of the United States Army Forces in the Pacific as a general guide covering the allocation of means and of coordination, in order to facilitate prior planning and prompt implementation, both operational and logistic. It is not designed to restrict executing agencies in detailed development of their final plans of operation.
- 3. The Study is being forwarded to the Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet, the Commanding General, United States Army Strategic Air Force and the Commanding General, Southwest Pacific Wing, Air Transport Command, for information and guidance.
- 4. Directives covering the operation in case it is to be conducted will be issued by this Headquarters at appropriate times.

For the Commander-in-Chief:

R. J. MARSHALL, Major General, U.S. Army, Deputy Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

Major Geled L, C.S.C., Asst. Chie of Safe,



"BAKER-SIXTY"

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC

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12 August 1945


1. DIRECTIVE.

- a. This Staff Study is derived from the Basic Outline Plan for "BLACKLIST" Operations, Edition Three, 8 August 1945. It covers an initial contingent airborne operation to occupy critical portions of the TOKYO area, in case conditions exist on target date that are favorable for prompt airborne entrance there. (See Annex 1 a, The Operation Directed.)
- b. The assigned task is to establish and secure an airhead in the TOKYO area and protect the Advance Echelon, GHQ AFPAC and subordinate head-quarters, pending the arrival of seaborne occupation forces.
- c. The 11th Airborne Division, reinforced, mounted from OKINAWA, is allocated as the major combat unit for initial commitment in the operation.

 The 27th Infantry Division, also mounted from OKINAWA, is allocated as reserve for the operation, to be committed following the 11th Airborne Division, if circumstances dictate such commitment.
 - d. Target date for the operation is V-J Day.

2. ASSUMPTIONS.

- a. Conditions are accepted as assumed in Plan "BLACKLIST," with the following additions:
 - (1) That the capitulation of the Imperial Japanese Government and High Command occurs prior to Operation "OLYMPIC."
 - (2) That this capitulation is orderly, with the Imperial Japanese Government and High Command appearing to be able and desirous of maintaining order and complying with the surrender terms in the TOKYO area.
 - (3) That selected individuals have accompanied an initial party into the TOKYO area to arrange for the surrender and these



individuals are able to locate at least two airfields in the area suitable for use in large scale air-landing operations by aircraft, or that as malar arrangements have been effected in the terms of surrender.

- (4) That the surrender terms include provision by the proper Japanese authorities for the exclusive use by U.S. aircraft including all existing terminal facilities, of such located airfields that are deemed acceptable for the operation.
- (5) That sufficient air transport means will be available for conduct of the operation from combined FEAF, ATC and USTAF sources.

3. OPERATIONS.

a. CONCEPT

This Staff Study envisages an initial airborne entrance into the TOKYO area by major combat elements. This entrance follows as soon as practicable after the Japanese Imperial Government and High Command have signified a desire to surrender. It assumes favorable conditions for such an airborne entrance, but is designed to exploit fully all the psychological advantages that would be inherent as a result of prompt and vigorous military reaction on our part to a Japanese surrender declaration.

As soon as practicable following receipt of and acceptance of the surrender declaration, an initial party, escorted by all available air power is landed at a selected TOKYO airfield. This party is prepared to inspect or survey airfields in the area in order to determine those that are suitable for use in air landing operations by U.S. aircraft. Following this determination, arrangements are completed for exclusive use of these fields for operation "BAKER-SIXTY".

The 11th Airborne Division is concentrated at OKINAWA prior to "B"

Day if practicable, but in any event as soon thereafter as the required air move-



ment can be accomplished. It is suitably reinforced in order to perform its required mission in the TOKYO area. Advance Echelons of GHQ AFPAC, Eighth Army and FEAF likewise move to OKMA preserved for proposition in movement to the objective area.

As soon as practicable after E-Day, "BAKER-SIXTY" air movement operations are commenced from OKINAWA and landings are effected without delay in the objective area. This air movement utilizes FEAF, ATC and USASTAF means for air transport, as available and required. The advance Echelons of AFPAC, Eighth Army and FEAF and the bulk of the 11th Airborne Division combat elements are lifted in the first serial. Subsequent serials are dispatched as soon as practicable and the entire force initially committed is moved to the objective area without delay. Reserve elements follow-up if so directed by CINCAFPAC. Upon landing, the airborne elements take immediate steps to establish and secure the airhead, as directed by the Commanding General, Eighth Army.

The air landing operations are conducted concurrently with continuous maximum combat air patrol over the TOKYO area utilizing all available means.

A Supply air-head is promptly established in the objective area and air landing of required supplies for the "BAKER-SIXTY" Force is continued until such time as full seaborne supply means become practicable.

b. EMPLOYMENT OF FORCES

(1) Organization

For organization of "BAKER-SIXTY" forces see Chart, Annex 3 b (1).

(2) Forces

(a) UNITED STATES ARMY - Command of U.S. Army resources in the Pacific (except Alaskan Dept, USASTAF and Southeast Pacific).

Command of occupation forces and imposition of surrender terms in accordance with plan "BLACKLIST."

Coordination with CINCPAC and USASTAF, and arrangements with ATC for MEARER-SIXTY."

Theater Command, SWPA.

-3-

1. Eighth Army

- "BAKER-SIXTY" planning, in conjunction with Far East Air Forces.

Operations of "BAKER-SIXTY" ground forces.

Preparation and mounting of all ground elements from LUZON.

Maintenance of airfields in the objective area.

2. Tenth Army

- Preparation and mounting of all ground elements from OKINAWA, as requested by EIGHTH Army.

Logistic support from OKINAWA.

3. Far East Air Forces

- Preliminary reconnaissance of airfields in the objective area, as directed by CINCAFPAC.

Provision and maintenance of airtransport for movement of troops, equipment and supplies as directed.

Protection of air-transport serials and provision of air support as required, utilizing FEAF means and additional means as arranged by CINCAFPAC with CINCPAC and USASTAF.

Conduct of/"BAKER-SIXTY" air movements, except those of USASTAF.

Operation of airfields in the objective area.

Preparation and mounting of FEAF elements from the PHILIPPINES and OKINAWA.

- 4. 11th Airborne Conduct of initial ground operations
 Div, Reinf. in the objective area as directed by Eighth Army.
- 5. 27th Infantry If committed, conduct of ground oper-Div. ations in the objective area, as directed by Eighth Army.
- 6. Pacific Wing Provision of air-transport for moveATC (under dir- ment of troops, equipment and
 ection of supplies, in accordance with
 CINCAFPAC) prior agreement.
- 7. United States Logistic support.
 Forces, Western
 Pacific

(b) UNITED STATES ARMY - Provision and maintenance of STRATEGIC AIR FORCE aircraft to perate under CINCAFPAC direction in accorwith prior agreement.

() UNITED STATES - As arranged in later conference.

- (3) Availability of Forces (See Annex 3 b (3), Troop List)
 - (a) Total ground commitment, less reserve elements, including 5 days supply, for Operation "BAKER-SIXTY" is as follows:

Personnel	Vehicles	D.W.T.	(exclusive	of
	to complete the section of the secti		weight of	
1 5,195	950	1,425	personnel	
100			vehicles.)

(b) Reserve ground elements, if committed, including 5 days supply, are as follows:

Personnel	Vehicles	D.W.T.	(exclusive of
And the state of t	entitionalista collection on a material management		weight of
11,000	500,	1,550	personnel and
			vehicles.)

(c) Air-transport means available for the operation, exclusive of USASTAF aircraft, are estimated to be as follows:

	Potential Air Lift			
	Personnel		DWT	
272 - C-46 (FEAF)	8,704	or	1,088	
100 - C-47 (FEAF)	2,000	or	223	
180 - C-54 (ATC)	7,200	or	720	
Total Potential	17,904	or	2,031	

NOTE: A total of 360 B-24 (FEAF) airplanes are available for supplementary use as carriers, particularly for transport of AVGAS, as required.

(d) USASTAF B-29 airplanes are available for use as carriers during the operation, depending upon availability of suitable landing fields in the objective area. They are however, also capable of executing parachute supply drops, if at any time this method of supply delivery appears desirable,

Air Lift

(4) Coordination.

- (a) CINCAFPAC is charged in the conduct of "BLACKLIST"

 Departure of the conduct of "BLACKLIST"

 port Command for provision of aircraft to operate under

 CINCAFPAC direction during operation "BAKER-SIXTY" are

 completed by CINCAFPAC. Coordination with CINCPAC is

 also accomplished by CINCAFPAC as required.
 - (b) The Commanding General, Eighth Army is charged with planning "BAKER-SIXTY" Operations in conjunction with the Commanding General, Far East Air Forces who in turn maintains operational control of all air movements, except USASTAF air movements. Maximum coordination of effort between the Eighth Army, Tenth Army and Far East Air Forces in OKINAWA will be essential to success of the operation.

The Commanding General Tenth Army is responsible for preparation and mounting of all "BAKER-SIXTY" elements from OKINAWA and for providing logistic support for the operation from OKINAWA, as requested by the Commanding General Eighth Army. This enables the Commanding General Eighth Army to retain primary responsibility for planning the operation in conjunction with the Commanding General Far East Air Forces and for conduct of ground operations in the objective area.

(c) The Commanding General Eighth Army develops and coordinates all logistic and supply plans for the operation, supported by the Commanding General AFWESPAC and the Commanding General, Tenth Army. The Commanding General, Far East Air Forces technically supervises the loading of supplies for aerial deriv.

c. THE OPERATION REQUIRED. (See Annex 3 c, Air-Movement Data.)

Tasks are assigned as follows:

(1) United States Army Forces Pacific

(a) Command occupation forces a

impose surrender terms

- in accordance with Plan "BLACKLIST." Direct an early reconnaissance to locate at least two airfields in the TOKYO area suitable for use in large scale air-landing operations by U.S. aircraft and include in the surrender terms an agreement by the Japanese authorities for the exclusive use of such located airfields by U.S. aircraft, including all existing terminal facilities.
- (b) Coordinate with CINCPAC as necessary, and arrange with USASTAF and the Air Transport Command for support and provision of aircraft, to operate under CINCAFPAC direction, as required.
- (c) Establish an Advance Echelon, GHQ AFPAC in the objective area as soon as practicable, to conduct "BLACKLIST" Operations.

(2) Eighth Army

- (a) Plan "BAKER-SIXTY" Operation in conjunction with FEAF, requesting support by the Tenth Army in OKINAWA in accordance with this plan as developed.
- (b) Conduct "BAKER-SIXTY" ground operations in the objective area as directed by CINCAFPAC.
- (c) Prepare and mount for air-movement to OKINAWA, all ground elements from the PHILIPPINES allocated for "BAKER-SIXTY" Operations.
- (d) Maintain airfields in the objective area.
- (e) Arrange for commitment by Tental Army of reserve elements from OKINAWA, as directed by CVINTPAC.

(3) Tenth Army

- (a) Support "BAKER-SIXTY" forces that are concentrated in OKINAWA for further air-movement to the objective area, as requested by Eigrah Army.
 - (b) Prepare and mount all "BAKER-SIXTY" ground elements from OKINAWA, as requested by Eighth Army.
 - (c) Furnish Logistic support for the operation from OKINAWA, as requested by Eighth Army.
 - (d) Prepare supplies for aerial delivery to the objective area.

(4) Far East Air Forces

- (a) Reconnoiter airfields in the objective area as directed by CINCAFPAC, in order to ascertain their suitability for use by U.S. aircraft in "BAKER-SIXTY" Operations.
- (b) Conduct all "BAKER-SIXTY" air-movements, except those of USASTAF.
- (c) Prepare air-movement plans in conjunction with the Commanding General Eighth Army and with the Commanding General Tenth Army as requested by Eighth Army.
- (d) Provide and maintain required airplanes for "BAKER-SIXTY" air movement of troops, equipment and supplies, except USASTAF airplanes.
- (e) Maintain such airplanes as are provided by the Air
 Transport Command in accordance with prior agreement
 reached between CINCAFPAC and the Air Transport Command,
- (f) Provide necessary air protection for all air-transport serials as required, utilizing such means for this purpose, in addition to FEAF means are arranged for by CINCAFPAC with CINCPAC and USASTAF.
- (g) Prepare and mount FEAF elements from the PHILIPPINES and OKINAWA.

1. Orecase lunging fields in the objective area. Teamedly derrise to eading of supplies for

aerial delivery to the objective area.

(5) Air Transport Command

- (a) Arrange with CINCAFPAC for provision of C-54 transports to be concentrated at OKINAWA with minimum delay upon designation by CINCAFPAC of "B" Day and to take part in "BAKER-SIXTY" operation until further notice under CINCAFPAC direction.
- (b) Confer with the Commanding General, Far East Air Forces to arrange details in connection with the operation and maintenance of ATC airplanes at OKINAWA during "BAKER-SIXTY" Operations.

(6) 11th Airborne Division, reinforced

(a) Conduct initial ground operations in the objective area as directed by Eighth Army.

(7) 27th Infantry Division

(a) If committed, conduct ground operations in the objective area as directed by Eighth Army.

(8) United States Forces, Western Pacific

(a) Provide logistic support for Operation "BAKER-SIXTY" as required.

(9) United States Army Strategic Air Force

- (a) Provide and maintain VHB aircraft to operate under direction of CINCAFPAC, as agreed.
- (b) Be prepared to provide additional air cover and air support for Operation "BAKER-SIXTY" over JAPAN, as arranged with CINCAFPAC.

(10) United States Pacific Fleet

(a) Support "BAKER-SIXTY" Operations as arranged for in later conference with GINCAFPAC.



4. LOGISTICS
a. GENERAL.

- (1) Present logistic planning an instructions covering operation MAJESTIC are applied to the maximum extent possible in this operation consistent with major changes in strategic and actual concept.
- (2) Elements of the EIGHTH ARMY and attached troops are staged, equipped and mounted for movement by air transportation with prescribed equipment less accompanying supplies, to the extent available, from the PHILIPPINES and RYUKYUS.
- (3) The U.S. ARMY STRATEGIC AIR FORCES employed in these operations are supported logistically in accordance with current arrangements and directives.

b. RESPONSIBILITY FOR LOGISTIC SUPPORT.

- (1) The Commanding General, EIGHTH ARMY is responsible for the logistic support of his command and attached troops, including equipping, mounting, supply and resupply of forces employed.
- (2) The Commanding General, FAR EAST AIR FORCES provides equipment and accompanying supplies and subsequent resupply, within availability, as required by the forces employed in these operations which are normally his responsibility.
- (3) The Commanding General, U.S. ARMY FORCES WESTERN PACIFIC, provides prescribed equipment and accompanying supplies as required by Commanding General, EIGHTH ARMY for forces mounting initially from the PHILIPPINES.
- (4) The Commanding General, TENTH ARMY, is responsible for:
 - (a) Providing equipment and accompanying supplies for forces mounted or staged from the RYUKYUS.
 - (b) Providing, within availability of stockage, the resupply and emergency supply be delivered by air

of such supplies when they are to be air-dropped to such forces.

(5) Commanding General, AIR TRANSPORT COMMAND, provides logistic support of forces under his command employed in this operation assisted by Commanding Generals FAR EAST AIR FORCES, TENTH ARMY and U. S. ARMY FORCES WESTERN PACIFIC as required and arranged between those commanders.

c. SUPPLY.

The Commanding General, TENTH ARMY, provides accompanying supplies to all Army forces employed in this operation and mounted or staged from RYUKYUS within the following prescribed quantities:

Classes I, II, III, IV (less construction materials) 5 D/S
Class V 1 U/F

- d. Resupply is as requested by the Commanding General EIGHTH ARMY, transported initially by air starting on the third day after initiation of movement of 11th AIRBORNE DIVISION, reinforced from the RYUKYUS. Until seaborne supply is available in TOKYO, the Commanding General, TENTH ARMY will make replenishment supplies available to the Commanding General FAR EAST AIR FORCES at the TYUKYUS for movement by air on the basis of one and one-third days of Class I, II, III and IV supplies being transported forward each day for the forces in the TOKYO area. Ammunition will be moved forward as required. Target date for discontinuance of supply by air: Landing date plus 12 days.
- e. Commen**c**ing B-Day or upon direction from this headquarters, the Commanding Generals TENTH ARMY **and** U. S. ARMY FORCES WESTERN PACIFIC, without delay, load supplies as indicated below in suitable available fast shipping:

Column 1

Column 2

Column 3

To be loaded by Commanding General TENTH ARMY for strength of 15,000

To be loaded by Commanding General U. S. Army Forces Western Pacific for strength of 20,000





Column 2

Column 3

5 D/S

20 D/S

l U/F for Airborne Division 1 U/F for

Upon completion of loading, this shipping will be prepared for movement to the occupied area upon instructions from this headquarters.

- ${f f}_{ullet}$ Resupply after the foregoing deliveries will be as prescribed for "BLACKLIST" Operations.
 - g. EVACUATION AND HOSPITALIZATION.
 - (1) The Commanding General, EIGHTH ARMY, is responsible for the evacuation to airstrips in the occupied area and the Commanding General, FAR EAST AIR FORCES is responsible for evacuation by air from airstrips including provision of necessary medical services enroute therefrom.

h. TRANSPORTATION.

The Commanding General, FAR EAST AIR FORCES is responsible for movement by air of forces employed, including equipment and accompanying supplies, and subsequent resupply as required and made available to him, as indicated in foregoing paragraphs, until such time as seaborne lines of communications are established. Upon establishment of seaborne lines of communication, logistic support by air transportation is discontinued except in case of emergencies, target date: Initial air-landing date plus 12 days.

i. CONSTRUCTION.

- (1) Construction in the occupied area for this force, is limited to provision of minimum essential operative facilities which can be provided or maintained from local materials until such time as seaborne lines of communication are established.
- (2) The Commanding General, EIGHTH ARMY, is responsible for reconnaissance of areas and facilities suitable for use by follow-up troops in the occupied area.

. j. MISCELLANEOUS.

- (1) Air drop risoners of War and Mations held in Japanese Camps will be initiated during the period of these operations in conformance with the provisions of Appendix Λ to Annex 4(Logistic) of "BLACKLIST" Staff Study of this headquarters.
- (2) Maximum use is made of available local resources including existing local installations and civilian labor to extent practicable.

5. MISCEMIANEOUS.

- a. For plan of communications see Annex 5 a.
- b. For data regarding Japanese airfields located in the objective area see Annex 5 b.
 - c. For pertinent meteorological data see Annex 5 c.



DISTRIBUTION LIST

"BAKER-SIXTY"

12 August 1945

C/S,	War Department	8
CEN	CPAC (ADV)	5
CG,	lst Army	1
CG,	6th Army	3
CG,	8th Army	3
CG,	llth Airborne Division	2
CG,	10th Army	4
CG,	FEAF	3
CG,	USASTAF (Guam)	1
CG,	USAFWESPAC	3
CG,	USAFMIDPAC	1
CG,	ASCOM "C"	1
Sout	hwest Pacific Wing, ATC	1
Staf	°f. GHO	8



DEGLASSIFIED

STAFF STUDY OPERATION

"BAKER-SIXTY"

Annex

1 a

3 b (1)

3 b (3)

3 c

5 a

5 b

5 c

List of Annexes

THE OPERATION DIRECTED

ORGANIZATION OF FORCES

TROOP LIST

AIR-MOVEMENT DATA


COMMUNICATIONS PLAN

JAPANESE AIRFIELDS IN OBJEC-TIVE AREA

METEOROLOGICAL STUDY

JUN 21 1885







ANNEX IA

THE OPERATION DIRECTED

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TOP SECRET



MNEX 3 b (3)

BAKER-SIXTY"

TROOP LIST

DW Tons

	Units	Personnel	Vehicles	(Exclusive of weight of personnel and vehicles)
1.	GROUND FORCES	and common to the contract of	THE STATE OF THE S	And the state of t
	ADVANCE ECHELON AF AG	609	30	130
	Signal Detachment (Mobile)	271	11	90
•	ADVANCE ECHELON EIGHTH ARMY	150	15	22
	llth Airborne Division	11,300	600	544
	Provisional Airborne Engineer Aviation Battalion	530	79	160
	l Portable Surgical Hospital	37	14	10
	l General Dispensary (Type 2)	20	1	<u>1</u>
	2 Bomb Disposal Squads	14	6	6
	2 Language Teams (Interpreter)	8	4	<u>)</u>
	TOTAL GROUND FORCES	12,939	7 50	. 970
2.	AIR FORCES	- Para Para Again ann Tuga ghlinn maga aghlinn Saigh a saigh an saigh a saigh an saigh an saigh an saigh	in 1964 Perlamenta u 1964 - North Carrier, Carrier Sandra, Carrier Sandra, Carrier Sandra, Carrier Sandra, Carr	
	ADVANCE ECHELON FEAF	147	20	70
-	3 Airdrome Squadrons	819	45	125
	3 AACS Detachments	116	.7	105.
	l Aircraft Warning Squadron (IW)	240	7	710
	3 Weather Detachments	38.	3	3
	l Aircraft Control Squadron (IW)	281	. 8	12
	3 Base Operations Administration	S ec 60	0	0
	3 Air Cargo Resupply Squadrons	555	36	100
	TOTAL AIR FORCE	2,256	200	455
	TOTAL FORCE INITIALLY COMMITTED	15,195	950	1,425
3.	RESERVE		of a Merical Annual Annual Annual Annual Annua Annual Annual Annua	ne mejerinde mentresa, republikanden egen egen egen egen egen egen egen
	27th Infantry Division (-)	11,000	500	1,550
***************************************	GRAND TOTAL	26,195	1,450	2,975
	DA ES CEA ES			

4. TO ONLINAWA ONLY.

Detachment, Air Cargo





ANNEX 3 c

"BAKER-SIXTY"

AIR-MOVEMENT DATA

1. BASIC DATA

a. PERSONNEL AND CARGO TO BE LIFTED

	Pers.	<u>Veh</u> , *	<u>DWT</u> **
Initial Force	15,195	950	2,061
Reserve	11,000	500	1,550
	26,195	1,450	3,611

Resupply for Initial Force - 250 DWT/Day beginning second day.

*Jeeps or trailers

**Includes 5 d/s and average vehicle weight of 1500#

b. AIRCRAFT AVAILABLE

•	Pers.		Cargo
180 C-54	140	or	9,000#
272 C-46	32	or	9,000#
100 C-47	20	or	5,000#
360 B-24	10	and	\$50 gals AVGAS

c. TERMINAL CAPACITY OF AIRDROMES

(1) Limitations

Landings in daylight hours only (10 hours).

Take-offs after dark permissible.

Parking capacity per airdrome - 80 aircraft.

Maximum number landings or take-offs per airdrome - 40/hour.

(2) Handling Capacity

 $\frac{10}{3}$ x μ 0 \approx 200 aircraft per airdrome per day.

d. AIRCRAFT TYPE CHARACTERISTICS

C-54 No refueling at terminal required.

C-46 or C-47 Requires approximately 450 gallons fuel at terminal for return trip.

B-24 Carries approximately 450 gallons refueling AVGAS plus ten personnel.

Refueling Requirement - C-46 or C-47:

Load from 1 B-21 for each C-46 or C-47.



DEGLASSIFIEN

e. USEABLE AIRCRAFT (Based on daily capacity of Three Airdromes.)

C-54

180

C-46, C-47

210

B-24

210 (To refuel C-46, C-47)

600

2. DAILY USEABLE LIFT

180 C-54 x 9,000# = 1,620,000# 210 C-46 x 9,000# = 1,890,000# 210 B-24 x 10 x 240 = 504,000#

Total

4,014,000#

3. REQUIRED LIFT

a. INITIAL FORCE

15,195 x 240 = 3,646,800# 2,061 x 2,240 = 4,616,640# Total 8,263,440#

PLUS: Resupply at 250 x 2,240 = 560,000# daily beginning second day.

b. RESERVE FORCE

11,000 x 240 = 2,640,000# 1,550 x 2,240 = 3,472,000#

Total

6,112,000#

Note: No aerial resupply.

4. SCHEDULE OF MOVEMENT

a. INITIAL FORCE

To Be Lifted

		1st Day	2nd Day	3rd Day
	Lift	4,014,000#	3,454,000#	795,440#
	Resupply Lift	-	560 , 000#	560 , 000#
	To Be Lifted	4,249,440#	795,440#	yeard SMM years
b.	RESERVE FORCE			
		3rd Day	4th Day	•
	Lift	2 , 658 , 560#	454,000#	
	Resupply Lift	560 , 000#	560 , 000#	

3₄453₄440#·



1. DIRECTIVE:

This plan covers the signal communications for an initial airborne operation to occupy critical portions of the TOKYO Area. It is based on the communications to be provided under "Basic Outline Plan, BLACKLIST"."

2. ASSUMPTIONS:

- a. (1) That normal command, administrative, and liaison communications will be functioning between the communications zones of CINCAFPAC and CINCPAC, and to headquarters of theaters and major supporting forces not directly participating in "BAKER-SIXTY."
 - (2) That normal signal communication systems required for cooperative action between CI_CAFPAC, CINCPAC, and the UNITED STATES ARMY STRATEGIC AIR FORCES will be functioning throughout "BAKER-SIXTY."
- b. That in the initial stages of the operation the following headquarters will be established and operating as follows:

CINCAFPAC - MANILA Advance Echelon - TOKYO

CINCPAC - GUAM

UNITED STATES ARMY STRATEGIC AIR FORCES - GUAM

68TH ARMY AIRWAYS COMMUNICATION SYSTEM GROUP - MANILA

EIGHTH U. S. ARMY - LEYTE Advance Echelon - TOKYO

TENTH U. S. ARMY - OKINAWA

FAR EAST AIR FORCES - MANILA Advance Echelon - TOKYO

ARMY FORCES WESTERN PACIFIC - MANILA

c. That existing signal communication facilities in the objective area will be seriously disrupted by aerial bombardment.



- d. That the 68th ARMY ARMY COLUMN CATION SYSTEM GROUP establishes such ARMY AIRWAYS COMMUNICATION facilities and radar navigational aids as may be required in the objective area.
- e. The UNITED STATES ARMY STRATEGIC AIR FORCES provide the signal supplies, equipment, and personnel required for UNITED STATES ARMY STRATEGIC AIR FORCES purposes in the "BAKER-SIXTY" Area.
- f. That CIMCPAC will install, operate, and maintain at Advance CIMCAFPAC in the objective area, the signal communication facilities required for the reception and transmission of orders, information, and intelligence between the Advance Headquarters of CIMCAFPAC in the objective area, and the appropriate headquarters and elements of CIMCPAC.
- g. Flans will be completed under the provisions of paragraph 3 b (3) of the Staff Study to which this is an annex whereby adequate communication for cooperative action between all forces will be assured.

3. OPERATIONS:

a. General:

- (1) In general, signal communication facilities for "BAKER-SIXTY" provide channels of communication between Headquarters CINCAFPAC, CINCPAC, UNITED STATES ARMY STRATEGIC AIR FORCES, EIGHTH U. S. ARMY, TENTH U. S. ARMY, FAR EAST AIR FORCES, UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES WESTERN PACIFIC and the designated elements of initial occupational forces.
- (2) Safehand air courier service is provided to the objective area.
- b. The EIGHTH U. S. ARMY, TENTH U. S. ARMY, FAR EAST AIR FORCES and UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES WESTERN PACIFIC install, operate and maintain the communication facilities required for the reception and transmission of orders, information and intelligence between their respective headquarters and Headquarters, CINCAFPAC in MANILA.

c. TASKS:

(1) The EIGHTH U.S. ARLY insures the provision of the signal communication facilities required to accomplish the tasks



assigned in the Staff Study to which this is an annex and in addition:

- (a) Installs, operates, and maintains the communication facilities required for the reception and transmission of orders, information and intelligence between its headquarters and CINCAFPAC in the TOKYO Area.
- (b) Insures the provision of an integrated inter-communication system between Air and Ground forces in the objective area for such intelligence, supply point, liaison, line of communication, defense, fighter control center, and aircraft warning purposes as may be necessary.
- (c) Assists the Commanding Officer, 68TH ARMY AIRWAYS

 COMMUNICATION SYSTEM GROUP in the establishment of

 such ARMY AIRWAYS COMMUNICATION facilities and radio

 and radar navigational aids as may be required by

 Air Forces in the objective area.
- (d) Insofar as practicable, immediately seizes and occupies in the objective area the operable communication facilities in the priority as shown in Appendix 1.
- (e) Provides security detachments for AFPAC communications in the objective area.
- (f) Provides Advance Echelon GENERAL HEADQUARTERS ARMY
 FORCES PACIFIC with a minimum of armed motor
 messengers.

(2) FAR EAST AIR FORCES:

(a) Provides the signal communication, aircraft warning service and air navigational facilities required for:

 Accomplishment of the tasks assigned in the
 Staff Study to which this is an annex.

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- 2. Air Force purposes for the cooperative action of all aircraft in the objective area.
- (b) Provides in the TOKYO Area the communication facilities required for air operational intelligence and air command and liaison purposes with the UNITED STATES ARMY STRATEGIC AIR FORCES, and air units of CINCPAC.
- (c) Installs, operates and maintains the communication facilities required for the reception and transmission of orders, information, and intelligence between its headquarters and CINCAFPAC in the TOKYO Area.

(3) UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES WESTERN PACIFIC:

Provides the signal communication facilities required for the tasks assigned in the Staff Study to which this is an annex and in addition provides:

- (a) A communication unit to move by air to the TOKYO

 Area to provide immediate communications for

 CINCAFPAC.
- (b) A Mobile Communications Unit to follow by water to supplement the air echelon above.
- (c) A Seaborne Communications Unit to supplement the air and mobile echelons above.

(4) TENTH U. S. ARMY:

Provides the signal communication facilities required for the tasks assigned in the Staff Study to which this is an annex with special emphasis on those required for the preparation and mounting of the "BAKER-SIXTY" ground elements from OKINAWA.

4. LOGISTICS:

a. Signal supplies, in general, will be from OKINAWA and the PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.




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- b. UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES WESTERN FACTFIC provides the signal supplies, equipment, and construction material required for "BAKER-SIXTY."
- c. The TENTH U.S. ARMY provides such communications for logistic support from OKINAWA as requested by EIGHTH U.S. ARMY.
- d. FAR EAST AIR FORCES provides the signal supplies and equipment for FAR EAST AIR FORCES technical purposes in accordance with existing directives.

5. PLANS:

- a. The EIGHTH U. S. ARMY, TENTH U. S. ARMY, FAR EAST AIR FORCES and UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES WESTERH PACIFIC will prepare and submit to this headquarters communications plans and requests for signal supplies, equipment and personnel to accomplish the tasks enumerated in paragraph 3 c above on or about a date specified in relevant instructions of this headquarters.
- b. Plans and directives for coordination of radio frequencies and call signs among forces concerned will be issued by this headquarters at an appropriate time.
 - 6. See Appendix 2, Principal Channels of Signal Communication.



DIRECTIONS FOR LOCATING COMMUNICATION OBJECTIVES IN TOKYO AREA

1. PRINCIPAL OBJECTIVES

a. 35° 44! 13" North; 140° 51! 58" East

The office and studios of Station JOAK, principal radio broadcasting station in JAPAN, are located in the block directly across from HIBIYA PARK to the south. It may be reached by going northwest from SHIMBASHI Railway Station along street car line for two blocks, then turn right and proceed two blocks to the northeast. This area is approximately 1800 yards southwest of Imperial Palace Grounds. It is a large, modern building, 7 stories high, on the southwest corner of the intersection. Transmitter site is at NAZAKI, northwest of TOKYO, and is connected to studios by land lines. There is the old 500-watt transmitter at the studio site. This is held in reserve in case of emergency. (This building also houses offices of Eastern Japan Radio Central).

b. 35° 49' 20" North; 139° 49' 15" East

Two 150,000 watt transmitter stations of Station JOAK are located in the same general area north of HATOGAYA. This location is about 15 miles north of the heart of TOKYO. Proceed northwest from area of Imperial Palace Grounds to OJI Railway Station. At this point turn northeast toward ARA-KAWA (river) and diversion canal, crossing these on the KOHUKU-BASHI (bridge). On the east side of bridge turn left and follow main highway to HATOGAYA. North of HATOGAYA follow east fork of road to ANGYO village. Transmitter site is southeast of village west of rice fields which border the west side of TOBU main line railroad (electric line) right of way. The buildings are large, modern ones and attractively landscaped.

c. 35° 42' North; 139° 52' 39" East.

Telephone Central Office is located east of Imperial Palace two blocks north of TOKYO Central Railroad Station.

d. 35° 42' North; 139° 46' East

Telegraph Central Office located in same block with Telephone Central Office.

e. 35° 52' 39" North; 139° 31' 12" East

Main receiver site for overseas radio telegraph service in TOKYO area is located in FUKOUKA-MURA. Receiver site is reached by proceeding northwest from heart of TOKYO along highway which parallels TOBU railway line keeping on south side of river. At the village of TSRUGAOKA turn northeast. Receiver site is a short distance off main highway on north side of road. Station is connected with main telegraph office in downtown TOKYO by land lines. Offices in JOAK Studio Building. (See paragraph 1 b).

f. 36° 16' 32" North; 139° 48' 00" East

Principal overseas radio telegraph transmitter site for Eastern Japan Radio Central is located southwest of OYAMA. Transmitters may be reached by traveling north from TOKYO across SENJU and SENJU-SHIN bridges, through KASUKABE to KOGA. At KOGA follow highway to OYAMA which runs along west side of main railroad line. Station is southwest of highway and railroad a short distance southwest of OYAMA. Transmitter site is connected by land lines with main Central Telegraph Office in metropolitan TOKYO. Offices are in JOAK Building. (See paragraph 1 a).

g. 35° 58' 30" North; 139° 37' 30" East

Principal overseas radio telephone receiving site for Eastern Japan Radio Central is located in KOMURO-MURA. Proceed northeast from Imperial Palace Grounds to KOTA Bridge. On north side of KOTA Bridge continue north through URAWA and OMIYA to village of AGEO. At latter point turn east. Receiver site is on south side of highway just before road crosses railroad line. Offices in downtown TOKYO in JOAK Building. (See paragraph 1 a).

h. 36° 10' 44" North; 139° 51' 00" East

Radio telephone transmitter site for Eastern Japan Radio Central is located in NAZAKI area. Proceed north from Imperial Palace Grounds to SENJU-BACHI (bridge) crossing river via this bridge and diversion canal via

SENJUSHIN-BASHI (bridge). Continue in no continue to KOGA via KASUKABE. Turn east at KOGA. Radio station is south of highway a short distance after passing through village of MORAKAWA. Transmitter site is connected with main telephone central office in TOKYO by land lines. This is principal radio telephone transmitter site for all overseas telephone service emanating from TOKYO area. Main offices of Eastern Japan Radio Central are located in same building with broadcast station JOAK's studios in metropolitan TOKYO. (See paragraph 1 a).

2. SECONDARY OBJECTIVES

a. 35° 39' 35" North; 139° 44' 40" East

An important meteorological station is located at the Central Meteorological Observatory in the northwest corner of SHIBA PARK. Proceed west from Hamamatsu Railway Station which is second stop south of Tokyo Central Station. This area is about 300 yards west of Hama Palace Grounds. The palace is located on the waterfront. Station has 2500-watt telegraph transmitters of both the continuous wave and modulated wave types. Serves important function as Air Weather Station for air forces.

b. 35° 41' 30" North; 139° 46' 10" East

Radio Telegraph and Radio Telephone Transmitters and Receivers are located in central TOKYO southeast of Imperial Palace. Proceed approximately 6 blocks southeast from Yurakucha Railroad Station along street car line. Continue following street car line when it makes right-angle turn to the left. Station is approximately 2 blocks from intersection in the vicinity of Kyobaskiku Warrant Office and Police Station.

c. 35° 43' 00" North; 139° 58! 20" East

FUNABASHI, long-range radio telegraph station operated by Navy, is located approximately 2 miles northwest of FUNABASHI. Turn northeast of CHIBA Highway at YAMANOMACHI and proceed northeast across Keisei Electric Railway line for approximately three quarters of a mile. Station is southeast of race track.

d. 350 44: 13" North; 1400 51: 58" East

Ship-to-shore radio telegraph station is located northeast of the city of CHOSHI. Follow high a palon vaterfront from CHOSHI to the north-

east past lighthouse at breakwater near efficience to be bor. Station is on west side of highway of METAGA-HANA (point). There is also an unidentified radio installation about a mile south which may be part of this station. It is approximately one-third of a mile due west of ASHI KAJIMA Station, about 400 yards east of highway running south from CHOSHI to TOGAWA.

Transmitter and receivers associated with this same station are reported in station logs to be located at 35° 45' 29" North, 140° 45' 16" East but have not been located on maps of the locality. If there is an installation there, it is about $4\frac{1}{2}$ miles northwest of CHOSHI in the vicinity of SHIISHIBA Station. It would be near main highway and railway from TOKYO to CHOSHI.

There are believed to be at least seven transmitters connected with this station, 4 of 3000 watts each and 3 of 500 watts each.


e. Transmitter and Receiver Radio Telegraph and Telephone Station is located southeast of TOKYO along bay shore. Site is south of Keisei Electric Railway line about ½ mile beyond MUKAIHARA Station toward CHIBA. It is a short distance east of the village of SHINDEMMACHI. There are 7 transmitters and some receiver stations, but principal receiver site is located north of TOKYO at TWATSUKI.

f. 35° 56' 50" North; 139° 41' 25" East


Radio Telephone and Telegraph Receivers site affiliated with station at KEMIGAWA is located north of TOKYO. It may be reached by following the same route to OMIYA as that used going to KOMUROMURA. At OMIYA turn east on highway which leads to KASUKABE. Receivers are a short distance north of IWATSUKI.


g. 35° 10' 40" North; 139° 00' 40" East

Land-to-Plane Radio Telegraph and Radio Telephone Station is located at southeast end of ASHINO-KO (lake), about 10 miles southwest of ODAWARA and 8 miles northwest of ATAMI. Station is on west side of highway running south from village of HAKONE near point where highway turns southeast to ATAMI. There are two 500-watt continuous wave telegraph transmitters, one 500-watt modulated telegraph transmitter and two 500-watt telephone transmitters.



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METEOROLOGICAL STUDY

EFFECT OF WEATHER ON TRANSPORT AIR MOVEMENTS BETWEEN OKINAWA AND TOKYO DURING THE MONTHS OF AUGUST, SEPTEMBER AND OCTOBER

1. GENERAL

Throughout the area along the airway between OKINAWA and TOKYO the transitional season between the cloudy summer months and the cool but more clear winter months prevails. The greatest hazard to transport operations will be typhoons and the frequent extra-tropical and inter-tropical cyclonic disturbances that form in the SOUTH CHINA SEA and travel in a northeasterly direction, cutting the airway. Weather conditions on the ground will be typically that of the sub-tropical area with frequent local rains, warm weather and prevailing northeasterly and easterly winds.

2. PRECIPITATION

Throughout the three months period over the general area covered by the airway, rain will occur 15-18 days out of a month with precipitation averaging 5-10 inches over the land. In general, precipitation will be greatest in August over the southern portion of the airway due to the persistence of the inter-tropical front over the area. During September and October the inter-tropical front moves south to the PHILIPPINE area and the numerous cyclonic disturbances form further south so that flying conditions to the north will improve.

3. THUNDERSTORMS

Thunderstorm activity should offer no great hindrance to air operations. They will occur most frequently in the southern half of the route during the month of August (observed 1-2 days per month) and become less frequent to the north during the months of September and October.



4. CLOUD COVER

Overall mean cloud cover averages .5 with overcast days observed 7-12 days of the month with minimum number of overcast days occurring in August and increasing during the months of September and October. Overcast conditions are most frequent on the northern portion of the route. Clear skies have averaged 5-10 days of the month with the maximum in August and the minimum in September and October.

5. FOG AND HAZE

Fog and haze will be of no great hindrance to operations except, possibly, during the month of August where haze at the terminals may interrupt operations for short periods.

6. VISIBILITY

Recordings of visibility under three miles have been observed 5-10 days out of the month with a slightly greater frequency on the southern portion of the route. Greatest restriction to visibility is due to precipitation due to cyclonic depressions passing over the areas. Terminals will not be closed for any great period and visibility should have no great deterrent effect on the air movement.

7. ICING

The icing level will gradually lower from 17,000 to 13,000 feet during the three months period. This should have no great effect on transport aircraft normally flying under 10,000 feet.

8. TYPHOONS

Transport operations will be held up for 2-3 day periods during the month of August and the early part of September, due to typhoon activity which will affect the route. Frequency of typhoons along the route averages two per month in August, decreasing to one per month in October. All in all, during the three months period there is a good possibility of four typhoons affecting the area, grounding all transport aircraft for a total time of 12 days.





9. COMCLUSIONS

assuming 3 days of non-flying weather

for passage of typhoons.

Operating efficiency can be expressed in percentage of the number of trips that can be completed per month as compared with the number of trips that could be completed under perfect weather conditions (100%). Factors to be considered are the effect of typhoons, tropical and inter-tropical fronts, cyclonic depressions, low clouds and restrictions to visibility at the terminals.

CRITERIA

(Percentage of completed trips per month as compared with 100% for month with perfect flying weather)

	August	September	October
Flying direct course assuming 3 days of non-flying weather for passage of typhoon, course of which usually parallels air lane.	45%	53%	50%
Flying dog-leg course on instruction of weather service avoiding cyclonic depressions and strong frontal areas,	63%	70%	78%

